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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Tabatha Rana Frakes appeals from her judgment of conviction and sentences for

trafﬁcking methamphetamine and conspiracy t0 trafﬁc methamphetamine.

Statement

On

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

June 13, 2018, Boise Police Ofﬁcer Green received a report from the Treasure Valley

METRO Violent Crimes

Task Force

that a red

Dodge Caravan was

of methamphetamine” from Nevada into Idaho.

Ofﬁcer Green, who was asked

transporting “a large

(TL, p.177, L.22

t0 assist, stopped the

van

for a series

—

amount

p.178, L.4; PSI, p3.)

0f trafﬁc infractions. (TL,

p.177, L.13 —p.179, L.18; p.183, Ls.18-23.)

Frakes was driving the van. (TL, p.184, Ls.13-17.) She told Ofﬁcer Green that she and
her two passengers were roommates; that they had been searching for Frakes’s father in
California; but that

now

they were heading home.

she did not have a driver’s license.

and her passengers

(later

(Tr.,

(TL, p.184, L.23

identiﬁed as Athena

van and ran a drug detection K-9 around

it.

p.186, Ls.14-23.) Frakes also admitted

— p.185,

L.2.)

The ofﬁcers ordered Frakes

Kay Lopez and Douglas William Lopez)

(TL, p.187, L.23

—

out 0f the

p.188, L.5; p.191, L.23

—

p.192,

—

p.194,

L.10; p.193, L.13 —p.194, L.1.)

The K-9
L.10.)

alerted

on the van and Ofﬁcer Green searched

Inside he found a bag

0n the

front passenger ﬂoorboard,

it.

(TL, p.193, L.24

Which contained

and glass pipes With a White substance. (TL, p.200, Ls.3-22; State’s Exs. 4b,
also found a glass pipe with white substance

(T12,

p.194, L.22

—

p.195, L.5.)

He

4c.)

plastic baggies

Ofﬁcer Green

0n the center ﬂoorboard between the two

front seats.

additionally found a blue duffel bag in the center ﬂoorboard

that contained

male clothing, a large saran-wrapped bundle, and one

plastic ziplock

bag With ten

saran-wrapped “smaller individual bundles.” (TL, p.204, L.15 — p.206, L.5; State’s EX. 6c.) A11
bundles

the

methamphetamine.

state

inside the

that

“The

Ls.8-21.)

tested

presumptive

package

total

positive

weight”

0f

all

for

the

van was 954 grams. (TL, p.389, Ls.16-22.)

charged Frakes with possession of drug paraphernalia and with trafﬁcking

methamphetamine, alleging she “did bring
(400) grams or

powder

crystalline

p.207,

(TL,

methamphetamine found

The

white

contained

to this state and/or

more of Methamphetamine.”

(R., p.32.)

With trafﬁcking methamphetamine (PSI, p.4), and

The

moved

knowingly possess four hundred

state similarly

charged the Lopezes

t0 consolidate Frakes’s case

With the

Lopezes’, Which the court granted (R., p.14). Frakes pleaded not guilty and the case was set for

trial.

(R., p.35.)

Frakes was subsequently indicted for an additional charge 0f conspiracy to trafﬁc in

methamphetamine.

(R., pp.158-60.)

The

state alleged that

from January 2018 through June

2018, Frakes and the Lopezes “did willfully and knowingly combine, conspire, confederate and
(R., pp.158—59.)

The

conspiracy charge was consolidated With the paraphernalia and the trafﬁcking charge.

(R.,

agree t0 trafﬁc” in methamphetamine through a variety 0f overt acts.

pp.41-42, 46-47, 167-68.)

Prior to Frakes’s

trial,

the state entered into a plea bargain with the

Lopezes, whereby they agreed t0 plead guilty “t0 a reduced charge of conspiracy t0 trafﬁc in

methamphetamine

at the

200-gram or more

Frakes’s case went to

they afﬁrmed,

up

among

large quantities 0f

to California.”

(Tr.,

trial.

(E

level.” (TL, p.270, Ls.4-10.)

Tr., pp.1 1-541.)

other things, that they regularly

methamphetamine”

p.317, L.17

— p.320,

t0 sell

L.9.)

and

The

made

state called the

Lopezes

t0 testify;

“trips to California in order t0

that they asked Frakes “t0 help

Douglas Lopez speciﬁcally afﬁrmed

0n the

pick

trips

that Frakes

“[knew] the purpose of’ the June 13

trip, that

offered her “three 0r $400” to drive them.

tested over

400 grams of the

“she

knew What we were

(Tn, p.321, Ls.2-12.)

“crystallin[e] material”

The

doing,” and that they

state’s lab expert,

found in the van, opined that

it

who

“contained

methamphetamine.” (TL, p.424, Ls.1-10.)

The jury found Frakes
trafﬁc methamphetamine.

guilty of trafﬁcking, possession 0f paraphernalia,

(Tr.,

p.536, L.4

—

p.537, L.3.)

The

and conspiracy

district court

imposed the

mandatory minimum ﬁxed ten-year sentences for the trafﬁcking and conspiracy charges,
served concurrently, and gave Frakes credit for time served for the paraphernalia charge.
p.560, L.22

p.251),

—

p.561, L.1

1.)

Thereafter, Frakes

which the court denied

argument in support”

for lack 0f

moved

to

the court t0 reconsider her sentence

t0

be

(TL,

(R.,

“any supporting documentation and/or evidence 0r

(R., p.262).

Frakes timely appealed. (R., pp.252-54.)

ISSUES
Frakes states the issues 0n appeal

1.

Must

this

as:

Court vacate Tabatha’s sentences pursuant to

I.C.

§

37-2732B(a)(4)(C)

impose ﬁxed 10 year terms unconstitutionally
infringes on the judiciary’s inherent authority t0 suspend a sentence under Article V, §
13 of the Idaho Constitution?

because requiring the

2.

Must

this

Court vacate Tabatha’s sentences because the

district court to

their

district court t0

assistance

state’s decision t0

permit the

sentence the Lopezes under LC. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(B) in exchange for
37in ensuring that Tabatha was sentenced under I.C. §

2732B(a)(4)(C) violated her rights to equal protection and due process under Article
1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution and under the Fourteenth Amendment
to the

United [States] Constitution and impermissibly infringed on her privilege

against self—incrimination and rights to

trial

under Article

Idaho Constitution and under the Fifth and Sixth

1,

Sections 7 and 13 0f the

Amendments

t0 the

United States

Constitution?

3.

Must this Court vacate Tabatha’s judgment 0f conviction for trafﬁcking
methamphetamine because insufﬁcient evidence supported the verdict and
conviction therefore violates due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
t0 the

United States Constitution and Article

1,

in

the

Amendment

Section 13 0f the Idaho Constitution?

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Frakes

failed t0

show fundamental

error With respect t0

any of her unpreserved

constitutional claims?

2.

Has Frakes failed t0 show insufﬁcient evidence supported
trafﬁcking methamphetamine?

the jury’s

verdict

for

ARGUMENT
I.

Frakes Fails

To Show Fundamental

Error With Respect

To AnV Of Her Unpreserved

Constitutional Claims

A.

Introduction

For the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, Frakes alleges that the imposition of ﬁxed sentences under
Idaho Code Section 37-2732B “unconstitutionally infringes 0n the judiciary’s inherent authority

t0

suspend a sentence.” (Appellant’s

brief, p.8.)

And

she alleges, for the ﬁrst time on appeal,

that the state’s decision to charge her with trafﬁcking a greater

amount of methamphetamine than

her co-conspirators “violated her rights to equal protection and due process,”

purported constitutional Violations.

None of

(Id.)

these

newfound arguments

Moreover, Frakes never says that any of these purported errors are fundamental

brieD—a necessary predicate
At any rate, Frakes
constitutional

for

making

fails t0

constitutional claims for the ﬁrst time

show any fundamental

error.

among

other

are preserved.

(ﬂ Appellant’s

0n appeal.

Idaho Code Section 37-2732B

is

and the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected claims otherwise. Charging

Frakes under Section 37-2732B was likewise constitutional and well Within the prosecutor’s
discretion. Frakes therefore fails to

B.

Standard

Where
novo. State

V.

Id.

error.

Of Review

the constitutionality of a statute

Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 71

constitutionality 0f the statute

appellate court

show fundamental

is

1,

is

challenged the appellate court reviews

it

de

69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). The party challenging the

must overcome a strong presumption 0f constitutionality.

obligated to seek a construction 0f a statute that upholds

its

Li.

The

constitutionality.

Frakes’s Never—Before-Made Constitutional Claims Are

C.

Of Fundamental
It

is

Error

Has Been Waived On Appeal

“well established” that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not address on appeal” a

constitutional “challenge to a defendant’s sentence

1991) (appellant “failed t0 raise
accordingly, he cannot

now

raise

[a]

it

constitutional

for the ﬁrst time

Idaho 439, 835 P.2d 674 (Ct. App. 1992); State

App. 1998). This

(Ct.

is

where the

(quoting

V.

on appeal”);

ﬂ

Inc. V. State,

App.

court, and,

also State V. Cortez, 122

BV

&

Through Dep’t of Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793,

842 P.2d 698, 701-02

Frakes never claimed below that Section 37-2732B

show

is

(Ct.

the transcripts in their entirety and see that the

that

534

(Ct.

unconstitutional.

word

“constitute[d]

it

App. 2014));

App. 1992).

(E

(E

R.)

N0

R.)

One can

“unconstitutional”

was never

dismissal motions pressing these constitutional claims were ever ﬁled.

less

to

396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)

State V. Clontz, 156 Idaho 787, 792, 331 P.3d 529,

by defense counsel—much

this

Thus, in order to raise a constitutional challenge to a

State V. Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022-23,

uttered

district

(Ct.

upon which the case was presented

sentence for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal a defendant would need t0

CTRL-F

1322

because “[i]ssues not raised below Will not be considered by

799-800, 589 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979)).

fundamental error.”

ﬁrst given an

Samora, 131 Idaho 198, 199, 953 P.2d 638,

State V. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

Heckman Ranches,

was not

argument before the

court on appeal, and the parties will be held t0 the theory

the lower court.”

court

trial

State V. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 808 P.2d

opportunity t0 consider the issue.”

639

Not Preserved And Any Claim

were the speciﬁc arguments raised 0n appeal, now

spanning some 13 pages worth of appellate brieﬁng, ever made below.

(E

Tr.)

Likewise,

Frakes never claimed below that the prosecutors’ charging decision amounted to a constitutional

Violation,

much

less the series

of constitutional Violations she

now

(m R.;

alleges.

ﬂ

Tr.)

Frakes’s constitutional claims are simply unpreserved.

Frakes does not directly address preservation in her brieﬁng.

However, she appears

Now, your Honor

brief.)

conclude these constitutional claims are preserved based 0n a single,

t0

made by defense counsel

offhand remark

(E Appellant’s

tells

my client

get penalized for going t0

trial,

at sentencing:

but in this

In this case, because 0f the mandatory

exercising her constitutional rights.

minimum, Tabatha

is

and over again, that they won’t
case Tabatha is being penalizedfor

frequently, over

going to g0 t0 prison for

at least ten years.

(TL, p.553, Ls.9-14 (emphasis added).)

Unspeciﬁc, generalized grousing about being punished “for exercising
rights” is insufﬁcient to preserve the

now

debuts 0n appeal.

therefrom

m,

is

constitutional

smorgasbord of speciﬁc constitutional claims that Frakes

Indeed, even “stating the

name 0f

not enough t0 raise every speciﬁc theory or principle of law within

165 Idaho 338,

_, 445 P.3d 147,

that the bare incantation

151 (2019) (footnote omitted).

It

it.”

necessarily follows

of “constitutional rights” does not conjure up every constitutional claim

Nor does

under the sun.

m

a case and a general proposition

a complaint about “being punished for exercising

rights” preserve a speciﬁc claim that a statute itself

is

constitutional

unconstitutional; or the separate speciﬁc

claim that those purported punishments themselves are rights Violations; 0r any 0f the other
speciﬁc Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth

federal constitutions) that

_, 445

P.3d

at

issue for appeal

Amendment

ornament page

after

theories

and arguments (under both

page 0f opening brieﬁng.

E m,

state

and

165 Idaho

at

151 (explaining that “a ‘kitchen sink’ strategy Will not sufﬁce t0 preserve an

and

is

inherently unfair”).

Frakes’s constitutional claims are accordingly not preserved.

And

Frakes would need t0

argue fundamental error to attack the constitutionality of Section 37-2732B 0r the state’s

charging decision for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal. State

978 (2010). She has not done

(E Appellant’s

so.

V. Per_ry,

brief.)

150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,

Because appellants must

raise issues

in their

opening brieﬁng to preserve them, any claim of fundamental error has been waived on

appeal.

I.A.R. 35(a)(4); Patterson V. State, Dep’t of Health

&

P.3d 718, 729 (2011); The David

Marvel Benton

Tr. V.

P.3d 392, 402 (2016) (“In order to be considered by
identify legal issues

This Court should

D.

& Welfare,

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 155, 384

this Court, the appellant is required to

and provide authorities supporting the arguments

rej ect

151 Idaho 310, 321, 256

in the

opening brief”).

Frakes’s unpreserved constitutional claims on this threshold basis.

To Show Any Fundamental

Alternatively, Frakes Fails

That Both Idaho Code Section 37-2732B

And

A

Error Because

It Is

Well-Settled

Prosecutor’s Evidence-Based Charging

Decisions Are Constitutional

Even assuming Frakes had
on the

merits.

unwaived

To show fundamental

constitutional rights

978 (2010).

alleged fundamental error 0n appeal any such claim

error the appellant

were violated.” State

V.

must ﬁrst show

Peg,

Second, “the error must be clear or obvious.”

that

would

“one 0r more

150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,

Li.

“This means the record must

contain evidence 0f the error and the record must also contain evidence as to whether or not

counsel

made

a tactical decision in failing to object.”

P.3d 129, 133 (2019).
decision

was

fail

State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115,

trial

_, 443

“If the record does not contain evidence regarding Whether counsel’s

strategic, the

claim

is

petition for post-conviction relief.”

factual in nature

Li

and thus more appropriately addressed Via a

Finally, the appellant

“must demonstrate

affected [his or her] substantial rights.” Per_ry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

that the error

Frakes

respect t0

fails to

show

the ﬁrst

two prongs of

her claim that Section 37-2732B

is

m

have been satisﬁed here—both With

unconstitutional,

Under

prosecutor’s charging decision violated her constitutional rights.

show any

fails t0

constitutional Violation whatsoever

and

and her claim

fails t0

the

that

either theory, Frakes

show any

error

is

clear 0r

obvious.

Frakes Cannot

1.

That

It

Show That

Otherwise Violated

Idaho Code Section 37-2732B

An Unwaived

Is

Or
Or That Any Such

Unconstitutional

Constitutional Right,

Errors Plaian Exist

Frakes has failed to show that Idaho Code Section 37-2732B, setting forth the mandatory

minimum

sentences

constitutional rights.

Constitution.

E

for

drug

It is

well settled that Section 37-2732B “fully complies” With the Idaho

gg,

trafﬁcking,

is

unconstitutional

State V. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 844,

or

934 P.2d

otherwise

violated

15, 17 (1997).

Frakes

herself acknowledges, as she must, that the people 0f the state of Idaho have written

She concedes

her

ﬁxed

dint of a

sentencing into the state constitution.

(Appellant’s brief, p.15.)

1978 amendment the “legislature

encroach on” the judiciary’s inherent “sentencing powers

may

by enacting an express mandatory minimum sentence pursuant

And

t0 Article

that

by

V, Section 13.”

she admits that “[t]he current statute no longer provides any means by Which the court

(Id.)

may

reduce the mandatory sentences, thereby seeming to meet the [constitutional requirement]
providing that mandatory
17 (citing

m,

It is

infringes

Fixed

minimum

129 Idaho

at 844,

therefore unclear

why

sentences ‘shall not be reduced.’” (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-

934 P.2d

at 17).)

Frakes concludes that Section 37-2732B “unconstitutionally

0n the judiciary’s inherent authority

minimum

sentencing

is

t0

suspend a sentence.” (Appellant’s

written into Idaho’s constitution.

Idaho Const.

art.

V,

brief, p.8.)

§ 13.

And

Section 37-2732B does not simply “seem[] to meet” the requirements of Art. V, §13, as Frakes

puts

it.

(E Appellant’s brief, p.16 (emphasis added).)

The Idaho Supreme Court has already

expressly held that Section 37-2732B “fully complies” with the Article

V

requirements, and

is

constitutional:

Further, I.C. §

requirement of

37—2732B,

after the

1995 amendment, fully complies With the

V, § 13 0f the Idaho Constitution that mandatory
“shall
not be reduced”. There currently is no provision in the
sentences
art.

minimum
statute

which the mandatory ﬁxed sentences can be reduced. Thus, we hold
current statute

is

by

that the

constitutional.

Puetz, 129 Idaho at 844, 934 P.2d at 17 (emphasis added).

likewise speciﬁcally rejected the exact

The Idaho Court of Appeals has

same “inherent authority” arguments

that Frakes

makes

now:
[Appellant’s] reliance

on State

v.

McCoy

is

also misguided. Garcia—Pineda argues

McCoy stands for the principle that the judiciary has an inherent power under the
common law to suspend the whole 0r part of a defendant’s sentence. The decision
in McCoy predated the amendment to Article V, Section 13 0f the Idaho
which states, in relevant part: “any sentence imposed shall be not
less than the mandatory minimum sentence so provided. Any mandatory
minimum sentence so imposed shall not be reduced.” Therefore, the McCoy
decision, and its reliance 0n the common law, is inapplicable to the current case.
Constitution,

State V. Garcia—Pineda, 154 Idaho 482, 485,

omitted, footnote omitted);

ﬂ

299 P.3d 794, 797Ct. App. 2013)

(internal citations

also State V. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 111, 343 P.3d 1110, 1118

(2015) (“In response t0 the Court’s holding in

McCoy,

the legislature proposed and the people

adopted an amendment t0 Article V, Section 13 0f the Idaho Constitution. Idaho Const.

§

13.

art.

V,

This amendment granted the legislature the constitutional authority t0 enact mandatory

minimum

sentences.

After the

amendment

to

Article

unconstitutional for the legislature t0 issue a mandatory

judiciary’s inherent,

common law

authority t0 exercise

10

V,

Section

minimum
its

13,

it

was no longer

sentence infringing upon the

discretion to suspend a sentence.”);

State V. Pena—Reves, 131 Idaho 656, 657,

962 P.2d 1040, 1041 (1997); State

V.

Rogerson, 132

Idaho 53, 56, 966 P.2d 53, 56 (Ct. App. 1998).
Frakes argues that Section 37—2732B was unconstitutionally applied here as a result of
the prosecutor’s choice to charge her with trafﬁcking

Frakes puts

it,

more weight than her

amount the trafﬁcked was

0f meth than they actually

less than the quantity

possessed in exchange for the Lopezes’ assistance prosecuting Tabatha.”
Frakes’s core complaint

limitation

As

“the prosecutor did not charge the Lopezes with a different offense and, instead,

alleged that the

p.17.)

co-conspirators.

is

that charging discretion

on the judiciary’s inherent authority

removed the

t0 sentence”

(Appellant’s brief,

statute

from the “narrow

found in Idaho’s Constitution: “[t]he

prosecutor’s authority t0 charge a lower quantity based 0n substantial assistance, thereby

authorizing the judge to sentence to a lower mandatory

minimum,

is

indistinguishable from the

prosecutor’s authority under the prior trafﬁcking statute, Which also authorized the judge t0

sentence under the mandatory

minimum based 0n

substantial assistance.”

(Appellant’s brief,

p.18.)

Here

too, Frakes fails t0

show any

constitutional Violation whatsoever, because the Idaho

Supreme Court has already squarely addressed

On

appeal,

[appellant]

because the prosecutor
prosecutor,

by deciding

This argument

is

this

claim and found

it

meritless:

argues that LC. § 37-2732B remains unconstitutional
still controls the sentences in these cases in that the
to reduce a charge,

can reduce the mandatory ﬁxed term.

Without merit. Prosecutors have always had the authority t0

reduce the charges against a particular suspect, and

charge a suspect at

in

deciding whether t0

all.

State V. Puetz, 129 Idaho 842, 844,

934 P.2d

15, 17 (1997)

Thus, the decision to charge Frakes

with possession of 400 grams 0f methamphetamine was well within
discretion,”

and was likewise

constitutional. Li.

11

this

“wide range of

Lastly, Idaho’s appellate courts

argument Frakes presses on appeal.
(holding

the

trafﬁcking

have repeatedly

rej ected

Pena—Reyes, 131 Idaho

the other ﬂavors 0f constitutional

“does not Violate Article

statute

656-57, 962 P.2d

at

5,

Section

13,

at

1040-41

of the

Constitution”); State V. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 616-18, 977 P.2d 228, 230-32 (Ct.

Idaho

App. 1998)

(holding the appellant “failed t0 establish that his prosecution under LC. § 37-2732B violated the

Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution or the equal protection provision of the
Idaho Constitution”). In particular, the Rogerson Court held that the trafﬁcking statute does not

and does not Violate the equal

Violate separation of powers, does not Violate due process,

132 Idaho

protection clause.

Section 37-2732B

is

at

unconstitutional or that

The second prong of the
error plainly exists.

“necessitates a

55-57, 966 P.3d at 55-57.

150 Idaho

Pe_n'y

at

App. 2012) (emphasis

in original).

test requires

228, 245 P.3d at 980.

State V.

It

show

that

violated any of her constitutional rights.

fundamental error

showing by the appellant

issue in the appellant’s favor.”

it

In sum, Frakes fails t0

Frakes to show the alleged

Demonstrating an error plainly exists

that existing authorities

have unequivocally resolved the

Hadden, 152 Idaho 371, 375, 271 P.3d 1227, 1231

also requires a

showing

(Ct.

that the error is clear as a factual

matter, “Without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record,

including information as t0 whether the failure to object

Idaho

at

was a

tactical decision.”

Pm,

150

228, 245 P.3d at 980; State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019)

(clarifying “that

Whether

trial

counsel

must be supported by evidence

made

a tactical decision in failing t0 object

is

a claim that

in the record”).

Frakes cannot show the alleged error plainly exists because she cannot show existing

authorities

As explained

have unequivocally resolved the issue in her favor.

appellate courts have repeatedly

afﬁrmed

that Section

12

37-2732B

is

constitutional

above, Idaho’s

and repeatedly

rejected the

same arguments Frakes now presses 0n

aside, Frakes does not point t0

appeal.

Moreover, controlling authority

any evidence showing “whether

counsel

trial

made

a tactical

decision in failing t0 object” t0 the constitutionality of the statute, nor

is

m,

“factual in nature

165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133.

more appropriately addressed Via a
46262, 2020

WL

1148807,

at

Thus, this claim

is

there any such evidence.

and thus

Li; State V. Saenz, N0.

petition for post-conviction relief.”

*5 (Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2020) (“Like claims 0f ineffective assistance

of counsel, establishing prong two 0f the Perry standard will necessarily involve inquiring into
the behavior and motivations 0f

development of the record, and
review”) Because Frakes

fails t0

trial

thus,

counsel. These inquiries will usually require factual

like post-conviction claims,

show any

error with respect t0 her claim that Section

Frakes Cannot

2.

Unwaived

are not suited to direct

clear or obvious error, she fails t0

37-2732B

Show That The

Constitutional Right,

is

show fundamental

unconstitutional.

Prosecutor’s Charging Decision Violated

An

Or That Any Such Error Plainlv Exists

Turning t0 Frakes’s other constitutional claim, Frakes argues that “the

state’s

charging

decision in the consolidated cases violated her rights to equal protection and due process under

the Idaho and federal constitution and impermissibly infringed

incrimination and her constitutional rights to

trial.”

on her privilege against

self-

(Appellant’s brief, p.18 (emphasis a1tered).)

Frakes again takes issue With the prosecutor’s choice to charge Frakes with trafﬁcking “the actual

weight 0f the meth” while charging her cooperating co-conspirators with trafﬁcking “a lower
quantity.”

insofar as

pp.19, 25.)

(Appellant’s brief, p.25.)

it

“was inversely related

Per Frakes,

this

was an abuse of prosecutorial

t0 the parties’ respective culpability.”

discretion,

(Appellant’s brief,

Frakes further argues this amounted to a constitutional Violation because “[r]ather

than being motivated by the large quantity 0f drugs, the state’s decision in this case was

13

motivated by Tabatha’s decision to exercise her rights to remain silent and require the

prove her

state to

guilt.” (Appellant’s brief, p.25.)

Frakes

is

mistaken in several respects.

First,

[w]hether t0 prosecute and What charge t0

ﬁle 0r bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”

United States

V.

Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Payan, 132 Idaho at 617, 977 P.2d at 231.

Moreover, “prosecutors necessarily must choose between

schemes each time a defendant’s actions
Idaho

at

statutes

satisfy the elements

upon

Payan, 132 Idaho

at

the possible sentence

is

617, 977 P.2d at 231.

of more than one.”

“Choosing

617, 977 P.2d at 231; Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125.

the other based

with varying sentencing

to charge

Pagan, 132

under one or

not in and of itself a Violation of equal protection.”

A

defendant must therefore “show more than an

exercise of that discretion” to establish an equal protection Violation:

The United

States

Supreme Court and Idaho Supreme Court

in their requirement that, in order to establish

are in perfect accord

an instance of discriminatory

application of the law such that equal protection standards have been violated,
there must ﬁrst be

shown a

deliberate plan 0f discrimination based 0n

unjustiﬁable classiﬁcation, such as race, sex, religion,

Li.

ﬂ

(emphasis added, quoting State
also Ovler V. Boles,

V.

some

etc.

Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 235, 743 P.2d 459, 464

(1987));

368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).

Frakes does not show any due process or equal protection Violation because she

show

that the prosecutor’s charging decision

was “based upon an unjustiﬁable standard such

race, religion, or other arbitrary classiﬁcation.”

remotely show that the

state’s decision to

meth was “motivated by
her guilt,” as Frakes

beginning of

this

gm,

368 U.S.

at

456.

Nor does

alleges.

as

the record

charge Frakes with trafﬁcking more than 400 grams of

[Frakes’s] decision t0 exercise her rights to remain silent

now

fails to

(Appellant’s brief, p.21.)

case—long before Frakes entered her not

14

T0

and

t0

prove

the contrary, from the very

guilty

plea—Frakes and her co-

conspirators were charged with trafﬁcking

evidence supported these charges.

400 grams of methamphetamine.

(E, gg,

Tr.,

(R., pp.32, 35.)

The record

p.389, Ls.16-22.)

The

therefore

demonstrates that the trafﬁcking charging decision was motivated simply by “the large quantity

Em,

of drugs” that Frakes and her confederates were transporting.
at

at

618, 977 P.2d

show

“the state’s choice

factor other than the large quantity 0f drugs he

was convicted of

232 (ﬁnding no equal protection Violation where appellant

was motivated by any

132 Idaho

failed to

distributing”).

Second, while the charges against the Lopezes were reduced because they accepted a plea
agreement, this does not

mean

that the state violated Frakes’s constitutional rights

unilaterally reducing Frakes’s charges because

by not

had reduced her co-defendant’s charges. “[S]o

it

long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense

deﬁned by

statute, the decision

Whether 0r not t0 prosecute, and what charge t0 ﬁle 0r bring

before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher V. Haves, 434 U.S.

And

357, 364 (1978) (footnote omitted).

enforcement

is

“the conscious exercise 0f

not in itself a federal constitutional Violation.”

Why? Because

exchange for the reduced charge.

(T12,

get a reduction.

It

is

plainly subject t0 prosecution, [does] not Violate the

V.

she reduced the Lopezes’

who

rejected such a deal, did not

well established that “openly present[ing] the

defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing

Amendment.” Bordenkircher

When

the Lopezes entered into a plea agreement in

p.270, Ls.4-10.) Frakes,

(TL, p.549, Ls.1-10.)

selectivity in

QM, 368 U.S. at 456.

Here, the prosecutor acted well Within her discretion

charges but not Frakes’s charge.

some

trial

Due

0r facing charges on which he

was

Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Haves, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); State

V.

Rodriquez-Perez, 129

Idaho 29, 33, 921 P.2d 206, 210 (Ct. App. 1996) (ﬁnding appellant’s “due process rights under

15

the Fourteenth

Amendment were

not infringed

When the prosecutor carried

out his threat to indict

Rodriquez-Perez for trafﬁcking in heroin after Rodriquez-Perez refused to plead guilty to the
delivery charge”).

And

this is

why the prosecutor—Who

understood and acknowledged that Frakes played a

smaller role in the conspiracy—explained that Frakes’s determination to g0 to

trial

nevertheless

meant she would not receive a reduced charge:
I indicated t0 your Honor earlier today that it has always been something that I
have considered that [Frakes] is less culpable that the Lopezes, and so I struggled

with their ability t0 get the ﬁve-year mandatory

had the ten year on two

different counts.

the defendant stuck with her story that she

anything about anything, which

But here we

are.

is

her

The jury convicted

minimum where

But despite

she, if convicted,

efforts t0 resolve the case,

wasn ’t involved and she didn ’t know

right.

her.

(TL, p.549, Ls.1-10 (emphasis added).)

This was entirely proper. Frakes cannot have her cake and eat
but expecting the state to charge her as if she had accepted a plea deal.

constitutional Violation

for their bargain.

by pointing out

that those

In the end, Frakes fails to

following a failed attempted at a plea

show

Who

it

too

by

insisting

Much less

on a

trial

can she show a

took the deal received some consideration

that this

bargain—much

was anything other than a

less

routine

trial

does she show any constitutional

Violation.

Finally, Frakes fails to

state’s

meet her burden

t0

show

Pﬂ’s

second prong with respect t0 the

charging decision. Frakes has not demonstrated that Idaho authorities have unequivocally

resolved this claim in her favor; as

shown above,

all

the authorities go against her position.

does she point to any evidence showing counsel’s failure to object t0 the
decision 0n constitutional grounds

was not

tactical.
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Even assuming

there

state’s

was any

Nor

charging

error Frakes

fails t0

show

fundamental

it

was

error.

plain or obvious, and therefore fails to

150 Idaho

at

228, 245 P.3d

at

meet her burden under

Per_ry t0

show

980; Miller, 165 Idaho at 119, 443 P.3d at133.

II.

The Jury Verdict Was Supported With

Substantial, Competent Evidence That Frakes Trafﬁcked
Methamphetamine

Idaho’s appellate courts “Will not overturn a judgment 0f conviction, entered

where there

verdict,

is

substantial evidence

found that the prosecution sustained

beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(citing State V.

its

upon which a reasonable

trier

0f

upon a jury

fact could

have

burden of proving the essential elements of a crime

State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387,

389 (2007)

Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956 (2003)). Reviewing courts therefore View

evidence “in the light most favorable t0 the prosecution, and
for that of the jury regarding the credibility

we do

not substitute our judgment

of the Witnesses, the weight of the evidence, and the

reasonable inferences t0 be drawn from the evidence.”

Oliver, 144 Idaho at 724, 170 P.3d at

387; State V. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); State V. Hart, 112 Idaho
759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987).

The

facts,

and inferences

t0

E M,

those facts, are therefore construed in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict.

Idaho

at

724, 170 P.3d at 387;

“[w]here there

is

ﬂ

211$

w, 112 Idaho

at

V.

144

761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Consequently,

competent although conﬂicting evidence to sustain the verdict,

reweigh that evidence or disturb the verdict.” State

be drawn from

this court

cannot

Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 644-45, 962 P.2d

1026, 1028-29 (2002); State V. Hoyle, 140 Idaho 679, 684, 99 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2004).

Frakes contends that there

because the

state

methamphetamine”

failed

to

that police

is

insufﬁcient evidence t0 support the trafﬁcking charge

prove that Frakes “had the power and intent to control the

found in the duffel bag. (Appellant’s

17

brief, p.22.)

She argues

that

the

evidence

shows Frakes merely “knew

methamphetamine
quantities” that

[Douglas

in the duffel bag, but conversely,

were strewn elsewhere

Lopez]

had a

large

“had the power and intent

in the vehicle.

quantity”

of

t0 control smaller

(Appellant’s brief, pp.22-23 (emphasis

added).) Frakes borrows an appetizing analogy from the produce aisle to explain

why

she thinks

this matters:

[T]he methamphetamine for personal use, although taken from the larger quantity,

from the bulk hidden within Doug’s backpack[1]. By analogy, consider a
scenario Where Tabatha helped the Lopezes drive t0 California t0 obtain several
crates 0f avocados for sale at the Lopezes’ produce market. Then suppose that
Doug used one of those avocados to make guacamole for everyone to eat with
chips on the ride home.
is distinct

That Tabatha possessed the bowl 0f guacamole would not give her dominion or
control over the avocados in the crates, despite the fact she

and had agreed

t0 help drive so

(Appellant’s brief, p.24.)

Doug could purchase

they were there

those avocados.

knew of the meth

Frakes concludes that “[e]vidence that Tabatha

Doug’s backpack and possessed smaller
is

knew

quantities set aside for

legally insufﬁcient to establish that Tabatha

in

consumption in the paraphernalia

knowingly possessed the bulk methamphetamine

stashed in Doug’s dufﬂe bag,” and that, therefore, “her [judgment] 0f conviction must be
vacated.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.)

This take 0n the evidence

is

portion 0f the charging language.

methamphetamine” goes
53, 58,

966 P.2d 53, 58

intent to exercise

1

The

state

ﬁmdamentally mistaken because

only contends With a

Whether Frakes “had the power 0r

to a single element: constructive possession.

(Ct.

it

App. 1998) (explaining

that

E

intent to control the

Rogerson, 132 Idaho

proof a defendant “had the power and

dominion and control over the substance”

is

“required t0 demonstrate in order

presumes that the occasional references in the Appellant’s brief t0 “Doug’s backpack”

are intended t0 refer t0 the duffel bag.

18

t0

prove that a defendant had constructive possession 0f a controlled substance”).

was not charged with trafﬁcking methamphetamine by possession

As

alone.

But Frakes
the

state’s

information makes clear, Frakes was charged with a series of disjunctive acts—the state alleged

knowingly possessed the methamphetamine 0r she brought

that either Frakes

it

to the state

0f

Idaho:

TABATHA RANA FRAKES,

0n or about the 13th day 0f June 2018, in the
County 0f Ada, State 0f Idaho, did bring t0 this state and/or knowingly possess
four hundred (400) grams 0r more 0f Methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled
substance, or of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
Methamphetamine.
(R.,

p.32 (emphasis added).) The jury instructions likewise plainly state that Frakes could have

been convicted based 0n a theory
that she brought

it

that she

knowingly possessed methamphetamine 0r a theory

into the state:

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant, Tabatha

14

Rana Frakes aka Zapata,

t0

be guilty 0f

Trafﬁcking in Methamphetamine, the State must prove each of the following:

3.

the defendant, Tabatha

Rana Frakes aka Zapata, did bring

and/or knowingly possess methamphetamine.

(R.,

.

into the state

ofldaho

..

p.105 (emphasis added).)

At minimum,
methamphetamine

state

either

0r, alternatively, that

had the “power and

element—not the

the

needed

t0

prove Frakes knowingly possessed the

she merely brought

intent to control” the

bring-into-the-state element.

it

into the state.

And whether Frakes

methamphetamine only goes

t0 the possession

m

966 P.2d

19

Rogerson, 132 Idaho

at 58,

at 58.

whether there was any evidencez that Frakes constructively possessed the

Thus,

methamphetamine makes no difference—because there was plenty 0f evidence
verdict

0n the

(R., p.32.)

alternate theory that Frakes “did bring

to sustain the jury

[methamphetamine] into the

state

of Idaho.”

Frakes was arrested in Idaho driving a van ﬁlled With methamphetamine purchased

The

(Tn, p.184, Ls.10-17; p.323, Ls.13-15; p.325, Ls.6-8; p.389, Ls.16-22.)

in California.

Lopezes testiﬁed Frakes knew they were transporting methamphetamine.

(TL, p.278, L.15

—

p.279, L.13; p.321, Ls.2-12.) Frakes agrees that the Lopezes “testiﬁed that they asked Tabatha t0

help drive on the two trips to California and that she

Lopezes to purchase a quantity of meth.”

knew

the purpose of the trips

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

And even

was

for the

Frakes

now

concedes “her role truly was limited t0 helping drive the vehicle” and alludes to the “[e]vidence
that

Tabatha knew 0f the meth” in the duffel bag. (Appellant’s

evidence proving Frakes trafﬁcked methamphetamine by bringing
this regardless

2

This

brief, p.24.)

it

into the

is

precisely the

state—and

it

shows

0f Whether Frakes possessed the methamphetamine, constructively or otherwise.

Moreover, even

if the state

methamphetamine”
comfortably proved this

the

in

was required
the

as well.

driver of a vehicle has obvious

WL

duffel

to

bag

prove Frakes “had the power and intent to control
to

sustain the

conviction,

the

state’s

evidence

Frakes was driving the van when it was pulled over, and the
power over items found within it. C.f. State V. Ebokosia, N0.
*3 (Idaho Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2019) (concluding that even a

3492493, at
46176, 2019
passenger 0f a vehicle had control over marijuana in the trunk, in part because “a reasonable jury
could conclude that in the course of a 1,855 mile trip, the parties would share the driving

Where the vehicle was not owned or rented by either party”).
Moreover, Athena Lopez testiﬁed that all three of them “moved about” the van during the June
13 trip, further showing Frakes’s ability t0 control the duffel bag. (TL, p.304, Ls.2-10.) As to
whether Frakes knew of the methamphetamine in the duffel bag, the state adduced ample
evidence that she did, including Athena Lopez’s testimony that Frakes was “in the hotel room in
California when the source delivered” the methamphetamine, the delivery was not secretive, and
they “all knew” about it. (TL, p.297, L.20 — p.298, L22.) Likewise, Douglas Lopez testiﬁed that
he believed Frakes was “in the room” When he received, unwrapped, and weighed the
methamphetamine that the source had just delivered. (TL, p.333, L.1 — p.334, L.12.)
responsibilities, particularly
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So Frakes’s avocado analogy
merely “knew [avocado
p.24),

crates]

is toast.

While Frakes implores she

were there and had agreed

any reasonable juror would conclude a truck

California avocados,

Who

driver,

is

akin to a driver

who

t0 help drive” (Appellant’s brief,

Who knows

his truck is stuffed with

agrees t0 transport the avocados across state lines for money,

bringing them into the state.

is

Replace the avocados with methamphetamine and you have more

than enough evidence t0 support a trafﬁcking verdict.

Any argument

is

Wholly

Frakes

fails to

otherwise

guacamole.
Substantial and competent evidence supported the trafﬁcking verdict.

show3 otherwise.

3

Frakes tacks on an additional argument that insufﬁcient evidence supported the verdict on

She claims that “the agreement underlying
the conspiracy t0 trafﬁc was the means by which Tabatha aided and abetted the Lopezes’
possession and transportation of the two pounds and Tabatha’s trafﬁcking conviction cannot be
sustained on an aiding and abetting theory without Violating double jeopardy.” (Appellant’s
brief, pp.26-27.) Much like Frakes’s other constitutional claims 0n appeal this is not preserved;
even squinting at the record, one cannot ﬁnd anything resembling a double jeopardy claim within
it.
Tr.) Frakes likewise fails t0 mention fundamental error, which she must to raise
R.;
Appellant’s brief, pp.25-27.) In any event, this argument
this newfound claim 0n appeal.
fails 0n the merits for the very reasons Frakes herself sets forth in her brieﬁng.
Frakes
acknowledges that, “[g]enerally, a conviction and sentence on a count charging conspiracy will
not, on the theory of double punishment, prevent conviction and sentence 0n another count
charging the substantive offense.” (Appellant’s brief, p.26 (citing Iannelli V. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 777 (1975); State V. Sanchez-Castro, 157 Idaho 647, 648, 339 P.3d 372, 373 (2014);
State V. Gallatin, 106 Idaho 564, 567, 682 P.2d 105, 108 (Ct. App. 1984)).) Frakes’s general rule
squelches her claim—the state did not doubly punish Frakes by alleging a conspiracy to commit,
constitutional grounds. (Appellant’s brief, pp.25-27.)

(E

among

ﬂ

(E

other things, the acts in the substantive offense 0f trafﬁcking.
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm Frakes’s judgment 0f conviction and

sentences.

DATED this

lst

day 0f May, 2020.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy of the foregoing BRIEF
and Serve:

that

I

have

day 0f May, 2020, served a true and correct
t0 the attorney listed below by means of iCourt

this 1st

OF RESPONDENT

File

ROBYN FYFFE
FYFFE LAW, LLC
robvn@fvffelaw.com

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General

KDG/dd

22

